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ABSTRACT 
Merger Profitability and Trade Policy 
by Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad* 
We study the profitability and welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy 
environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equilibrium. We show that 
merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it is not profitable in 
a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments’ incentives to 
give subsidies to their local firms. We apply the results to the merger between Boeing 
and McDonnell-Douglas, where subsidies are a constant matter of debate. Our theory 
explains why the merger was profitable for Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, why 
Airbus Industries opposed the merger, why the US authorities agreed to the merger, and 
why the EU competition authorities opposed it. 
 
Keywords: Merger, strategic trade policy 
JEL classification: D43, D44, F12, L11, L13 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Fusionen und Handelspolitik  
Wir betrachten die Profitabilität und die Wohlfahrtseffekte von Unternehmensfusionen 
in einer internationalen Welt, in der Staaten das Instrument strategischer Außenhandels-
politik nutzen. Die Rückwirkungen der Fusionen auf die Wahl der strategischen Außen-
handelspolitik machen Fusionen von Unternehmen des gleichen Landes profitabel, 
selbst wenn diese Fusionen in einer Welt ohne Außenhandelssubventionen nicht 
profitabel wären. Diese Resultate können erklären, weshalb die Fusion zwischen Boeing 
und McDonnell-Douglas profitabel war, weshalb Airbus unter der Fusion leidet und 
weshalb die US-Wettbewerbsbehörde der Fusion gegenüber positiver eingestellt war als 
die europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde. 
                                                 
*  The first author acknowledges support of the Economic and Social Research Council (UK). The work 
was part of the program of the ESRC Research Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution. 
1 Introduction
Horizontal merger is a frequent phenomenon, despite the fact that the in-
centives for such mergers are fairly obscure. In a linear Cournot market, for
example, two firms never have an incentive to merge (see Salant, Switzer,
and Reynolds 1983). The literature has invoked the cost advantages of a
merger (Perry and Porter 1985), but the existence of such economies of scale
or economies of scope is not well documented empirically.
An alternative explanation of why mergers take place has to do with the
fact that firms operate in a more complex strategic environment.1 In this
environment the merger may change the strategic context between the two
merging firms and other players as well. In this paper we argue that merger
changes the incentives for governments to use strategic trade policy. These
changes may make a merger profitable from the perspective of the merging
firms, and may even yield a welfare gain, from both a national and a world
perspective.
The recent merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas can serve as
an illustration. In the pre-merger situation there were three producers of
large aircrafts: A(irbus), B(oeing) and M(cDonnel Douglas). A is located
in country 1 (the EU), B and M are located in a diﬀerent country 2 (the
US). In the absence of strategic trade policy, the merger between Boeing
and McDonnell-Douglas changed the situation from a triopoly to a duopoly
in aircraft manufacturing. If competition in this industry is described by
quantity competition (or, equivalently, by capacity choices with subsequent
price competition) in an otherwise competitive world the merger is unlikely
to increase the profits of the merging firms and unlikely to increase welfare
in the US, or in the world as a whole.
Suppose now that the US and the EU use strategic trade policy and sub-
sidize their own aircraft manufacturers. It is known that these subsidies have
a strategic eﬀect. Subsidies to one firm shift this firm’s reaction function and
this can improve the strategic position of the subsidized firm. Accordingly, a
country that subsidizes its home firm induces output reductions in all other
firms, and this stategic eﬀect may increase the profits (and the welfare) in
the country (Brander and Spencer 1985). Given that B and M are both
located in the US, the situation is slightly diﬀerent here. The US position
in the pre-merger situation is unfortunate. If the US subsidizes B it will
1Two other papers add further strategic aspects to the picture. Lommerud, Straume
and Sørgard (2001) consider the role of local or central wage bargaining for the profitabil-
ity of merger. Coming from a diﬀerent direction, Chae and Heidhues (2001) consider
collusion of players in groups that bargain with each other and identify conditions when
such collusion increases the colluding players’ payoﬀs in ’non-pure’ bargaining situations.
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harm not only A, but also M, a firm that is also located in the US. Paying
strategic trade subsidies to one of their home firms has a cannibalizing eﬀect
as it harms the other firm located in the US. Accordingly, in the pre-merger
situation, the fact that B and M are both located in the US puts the US in
a disadvantageous position in the strategic trade game.
The merger removes this disadvantage. We would expect an increase in
US strategic trade subsidies to BM, and, as an equilibrium eﬀect, a reduction
in EU strategic trade subsidies to A. As a result, we find that profits of BM
in the new strategic trade equilibrium increase due to the merger, whereas
profits of A decrease. Further, where all sales are made in a third country,
the merger increases welfare in the country in which the merger takes place,
and it reduces the welfare in the country whose firm is not involved in the
merger.
We obtain this result for two diﬀerent types of competition both of which
may be relevant in many export industries. We first consider Cournot com-
petition with linear cost, as in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). Cournot
competition is the most commonly studied type of competition, and, due to
the equivalence result by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), it is more realistic
than previously thought.2 We show that taking endogenous strategic trade
policy into account fully reverses the results in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983).
However, competition in export industries often has clear elements of a
contest, and this is particularly relevant in hi-tech industries such as aircraft
manufacturing, high-speed train systems, or defense industries (see Konrad
2000).3 We show that endogenous trade policy has eﬀects for merger in
markets with competition by contests similar to those in Cournot markets.
It can increase the profitability of the merger, and it can increase the welfare
of the country in which the merger occurs.
Coming back to the merger between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas,
strategic trade policy seemingly plays a major role in this market. Hidden
subsidies are a perpetual matter of much debate between the major aircraft
2Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that straightforward quantity competition in a
Cournot duopoly yields the same outcome as Bertrand price competition preceeded by
capacity choice.
3For instance, with the launch of the A380 by Airbus that takes estimated USD 10.7
billion (Business Week, March 5, 2001, p.20) Airbus tries to earn monopoly rents in the
market segment for aircrafts with more than 400 seats. Also the discounts of up to 40
percent on early orders (see BusinessWeek, March 5, 2001, p.20) can be seen as “eﬀort” in
a contest for rents. Moreover, in defense procurement, applying for the contract is often
seen as a contest and the firm that is awarded the contract is seen as the winner (see, e.g.,
Economist, August 12, 2000, p.69 on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) “...which will be the
biggest defense procurement deal ever, worth up to USD 300 billion for the winner.”)
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manufacturers, and the two countries in which they are located,4 both sides
claiming that their competitor firm is highly subsidized, for instance, through
defense contracts or preferential governmental loans. Our results can explain
why firms like Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas merged, and why their com-
petitors in other countries, such as Airbus Industries, disliked the merger.
(Standard models invariantly predict that competitors gain from a merger
of other firms.) It is well known that there was considerable opposition to
this merger on the European side, whereas the US competition authority
looked at the merger quite favorably (see, e.g., Economist, July 19th, 1997).
If one assumes that national competition authorities care about national wel-
fare, the results can also explain the diﬀerent attitudes of European and US
competition authorities towards the merger. Whether national competition
authorities care about national welfare is not entirely uncontroversial in the
literature. For instance, Neven and Röller (2000) note that antitrust agencies
in the US and Europe formally operate with a bias in favor of consumers and
look at whether this bias is counterbalanced by firms’ lobbying activities.
However, this tension may be less relevant for export industries. The fact
that competition authorities often do not intervene if exporting firms cartel-
lize their exports is revealing. Also, competition agencies are sometimes
openly accused of national protectionism.5 The applicability of our results
for interpreting the competition authorities’ contradictory views depends on
this assumption about the competition authorities’ objectives. However, our
results on the profitability and the welfare eﬀects of the merger do not.
As optimal trade policy can be understood as a country’s attempt to
generate the amount of coordination among its exporting firms that is opti-
mal from a national perspective, trade policy and merger policy are closely
linked. This link has been highlighted in a number of papers. Head and
Ries (1997) consider national incentives to block national mergers in an in-
ternational context. The analysis by Richardson (1999) shows that “slack
competition policy” is a substitute for trade restrictions: tariﬀs act as a co-
ordination device that can change the behavior of a country’s competitive
industry towards behaving like a colluding group of suppliers who use their
4See, e.g., Wirtschaftswoche no. 21, May 17, 2001, p. 70.
5For instance, Jay Rockefeller, chairman of the US senate subcommittee on aviation,
implicitly accused and threatened the EU commission in a letter to the commission vice
president and transport commissioner Loyola de Palacio regarding the imminent EU de-
cision on the merger between Honeywell and General Electric: “If it appears that the
European Commission is unfairly blocking mergers between US companies principally to
protect the position of European competitors, then the subcommittee will need to re-
examine the open market the US has maintained for those sorts of acquisitions.” (See
Andrew Hill, Financial Times, June 21, 2001.)
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market power. A similar argument holds for price-taking consumers. Cowan
(1989) considers competition policy and strategic trade policy with one im-
porting country and one exporting country. Diﬀerently from these analyses,
we consider firms’ incentives to merge and show that strategic trade pol-
icy generates results that contrast with the results in Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds (1983) that consider a similar framework in the absence of strate-
gic trade policy. Section 2 considers merger and strategic trade policy in
an international Cournot oligopoly. Section 3 considers the same game with
competition by contests, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Cournot competition
Consider the merger problem as in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) in the
context of strategic trade policy as in Brander and Spencer (1985). Suppose
there are n firms, located in k countries. The set of firms is denoted by N
and the set of countries by K. The set of firms in country j is denoted by Nj
and nj is the number of firms in country j. Accordingly,
S
j∈K Nj = N andP
j∈K nj = n. For relevant cases, the number of countries and the number of
firms in each country will be small, but our results are derived for the general
case here.
The firms are owned by inhabitants of the country in which they are
located.6 They produce a homogenous good and compete in a standard
Cournot game. Each firm chooses its quantity xi simultaneously with all
other firms. They sell their products exclusively in a market in a country that
is not in the set K.7 Before the firms choose their quantities, each country j
decides about subsidizing the sales of all firms located in this country by a
per-unit subsidy. We limit consideration to cases where all firms in the same
country have to receive the same per-unit subsidy, denoted sj for country j.8
6This assumes away the possibility of internationally dispersed share ownership, where
the profits of a firm located in country i are part of country j’s welfare. The assump-
tion is in line with empirically well documented strong home country biases in portfolio
composition. The assumption also fits with the Boeing-Airbus example, where Boeing
and McDonnell-Douglas can be expected to have predominantly US shareholders and Air-
bus industries have predominantly European shareholders, including several European
governments themselves. International dispersion of shareholdings changes the strategic
environment. A paper that has highlighted this fact in a diﬀerent context is Barros and
Cabral (1994).
7Brander and Spencer (1985) make this assumption to remove considerations of con-
sumer rent from the picture so as to single out and highlight the strategic interaction
of firms. Consumer rents in the exporting countries are a matter of consideration in a
broader analysis in which the results derived here remain relevant.
8While this non-discrimination provision is a plausible assumption (especially from a
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All n firms observe the subsidy choices in all countries before they choose
their quantities.
Demand for the homogenous good is downward sloping and linear and
can, thus, be normalized to
p(X) = 1−X, (1)
where X ≡
P
i∈N xj. We also follow Switzer, Salant and Reynolds (1983)
and assume that all firms have the same constant cost c per unit of output,
and that this cost is not changed if a merger occurs.
In a completely unregulated world economy the Cournot equilibrium
would entail xi = 1−cn+1 . Given the subsidies (s1, ...sk), the n-player Cournot
subgame for given subsidies has a diﬀerent solution. Using (1), firm i’s profit
that is located in country j can be written as
Πi = xi(1−X − c+ sj) (2)
while welfare in country j is described by the sum of the revenues of the
country’s firms net of production cost,
Wj =
X
i∈Nj
(p(X)− c)xi. (3)
The subsidy payments reduce government revenue and increase firm profits.
Hence, they net out in the equation determining a country’s welfare. The
two-stage game is solved in the Appendix. We obtain
Lemma 1 Profit of a firm i in country j is
Π∗i (n, nj) =
·
(1− c) n− nj + 1
(kn+ k − n+ 1)nj
¸2
(4)
while country j’s welfare is
W ∗j (n, nj) = (1− c)
2 n− nj + 1
(kn+ k − n+ 1)2
. (5)
These results can be used to determine the consequences of a merger for
firm profits and the welfare of the countries. We analyze the general case of
a group of m > 1 firms that merge. When stating our results we distinguish
between firms that are involved in the merger, their competitors within the
same country, and their competitors in other countries.
legal point of view), it is not clear a priori whether it restricts the generality of the results.
Countries may want to pursue asymmetric strategies.
6
2
3
4
5
6
k
10
15
20
n
4
4.5
5
Figure 1: Critical nj for profitability of m = 2 as a function of k and n.
Proposition 1 (i) A merger in country j is never profitable for firms in
country r 6= j. (ii) A merger in country j is always profitable for competitors
in the same country. (iii) A merger is profitable for the group of merging
firms in country j if
nj < (m+
√
m)
(k − 1)(n−m) + 2k
(k − 1)(n−m−
√
m+ 1) + 2
(6)
For a proof of Proposition 1 we compare the respective profits (4). The in-
equality of the third part of the result, which determines whether the merger
is profitable or not, merits some attention. In general, it says that the num-
ber of firms in the country in which the merger takes place must not be too
big. The critical size increases in the total number of firms n and decreases
in the number of countries. Thus, a merger of given size m is rather prof-
itable in an industry where there are many firms in a few countries than the
other way round. A special case that is of particular interest is the case of a
bilateral merger and Figure 1 plots the critical nj for m = 2. It can be seen
that bilateral mergers are rarely profitable if there are initially more than 5
firms in the country in which the merger is planned. Otherwise the reduction
of the cannibalization eﬀect is too small.
We will discuss this Proposition 1 further once we have established the
next result on welfare.
Proposition 2 A merger of m firms in country j is always beneficial for
country j. It can be harmful for other countries.
The proof of the first part of Proposition 2 follows from comparing the
respective equilibrium welfare levels as described by (5). Further it is shown
7
by an example below that the merger can be harmful for the welfare in other
countries.
In the laissez-faire case considered by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)
a firm which is not involved in the merger always benefits from the merger
of other firms. This is true because two eﬀects add: the merger reduces the
number of competitors, and this yields a smaller total industry output, and
hence, higher prices. Also, as firms’ outputs are strategic substitutes in a
Cournot oligopoly, a firm that is not involved in the merger will increase
its equilibrium output. Hence, the firm gains from a larger own equilib-
rium quantity and a higher equilibrium price. Proposition 1 shows that this
standard result is reversed in a strategic trade context. Firms that are not
located in the country in which the merger occurs always lose if firms in
another country merge.
The intuition for this result can be explained in the case with two coun-
tries 1 and 2 and three firms, A, located in country 1, and B and M, located
in country 2. Without a merger, country 2 faces the following problem. It
wants to subsidize firm B; this subsidy induces firm B to choose a higher out-
put, and anticipating this higher output, the other country’s firm A chooses
a smaller output in the equilibrium. This strategic eﬀect on the other coun-
try’s firms’ output makes the strategic export subsidy attractive. However,
the subsidy has a negative side eﬀect here. Not only is firm A’s output
reduced. Country 2’s second firm M will also reduce output if firm B is
subsidized. This cannibalizing eﬀect makes it less attractive for a country
to use strategic trade policy if many firms are located in the country. If the
two firms B and M merge, then this side eﬀect disappears. Country 2 will
use strategic trade policy more aggressively, and this will harm the firm in
country 1.
The intuition for the welfare eﬀects can be developed as follows. A merger
does not change welfare and firm profits in the same direction in this frame-
work. If firms merge in country 2, this country can use strategic trade policy
more eﬃciently and will make more use of it. Hence, for unchanged trade
subsidies in other countries, this direct eﬀect will increase the output of
this country’s firms and will harm the firms in other countries. The welfare
benefit of this eﬀect is typically smaller than the resulting profit increase,
but typically goes into the same direction. Further, anticipating country 2’s
behavior, the other country 1 will typically use strategic trade policy less
aggressively. This further benefits the firm(s) in country 2 and country 2’s
welfare.
For illustration we calculate the equilibrium subsidies for the two-countries
three-firms case and find s1 = 1−c3 and s2 = 0. As country 1’s subsidy harms
foreign competitors only, whereas country 2’s subsidy has a cannibalizing
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eﬀect, s1 should be bigger than s2. Calculating welfare in country 1 and in
country 2 using these subsidy rates yields
W1 =
(1− c)2
12
and W2 =
(1− c)2
18
, (7)
and profits
πA =
(1− c)2
4
, and πB = πM =
(1− c)2
36
. (8)
Note that both welfare in country 1 and firm profits in country 1 are higher
than welfare and the sum of firm profits in country 2 in this example, even
though country 2 has two firms and country 1 has only one firm. If a merger
of firms B and M occurs, the equilibrium subsidies are s1 = s2 = 1−c5 . This
leads to welfare equal to
W1 = W2 =
2
25
(1− c)2 (9)
and profits equal to
πA = πBM =
4
25
(1− c)2. (10)
Comparing these profits and welfare levels shows that, for the linear case
considered, country 2 gains from the merger in terms of both increased firm
profits and increased total rent or welfare. The competitor in country 1
loses and the welfare in country 1 is also reduced. The laissez-faire results
in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) are fully reversed. Hence, strategic
trade policy explains why merger is profitable for the merging firms and bad
for competitors in other countries.
3 R&D, and promotional competition
Cournot competition is probably the most frequently studied type of compe-
tition, and, in order to emphasize the importance of a strategic trade policy
environment for profitability and welfare implications of merger, we consid-
ered strategic trade policy in a set-up that stays as closely as possible with
the analysis of merger by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), showing that
their results on profitability and welfare reverse in this case. However, as
discussed in the introduction, R&D contests and other types of contest com-
petition, for instance, promotional competition (Schmalensee 1976, 1992)
may describe the competition among many exporting industries (including
aircraft manufacturing) more suitably. Hence, in what follows we consider
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contest competition between firms, and analyze the impact of merger in a
strategic trade environment.
A general description of contest competition is as follows. Firms spend
eﬀort in order to win a prize V . We normalize this prize to V ≡ 1. For
simplicity, this prize is exogenously given. The prize can be the profit of the
winner of a patent race, or the monopoly profit of a firm which successfully
bribes the government, or industry profit in an industry in which product
prices are fixed, etc. Accordingly, the type of eﬀort can be R&D investment,
lobbying expenditure, bribes, expenditure on promotion, etc. In the contest
the prize is allocated according to a contest success function
qi(e) =
ei
E
(11)
where the ei is a non-negative amount of resources firm i spends on the
contest activity,
E ≡
X
j∈N
ej (12)
is the sum of all eﬀorts, and e is the vector of all firms’ contest eﬀorts. In
some instances, e.g., promotional competition, qi can be interpreted as the
share in the whole market which firm i will have. In many other cases qi can
be interpreted as the probability of firm i winning the prize. The probability
that this firm wins the prize is higher if the firm’s own eﬀort is higher and
if the other firms’ total eﬀort is lower. The interpretations of qi as market
share or as win probability will both lead to equivalent payoﬀ functions.
The contest success function (11) is a ‘short cut’ that is well justified.
It has been used, e.g., by Schmalensee (1992) for describing promotional
competition. It also adequately describes the outcome of probabilistic R&D
models. For instance, (11) is the success probability of firm i in an R&D
contest in which firms j ∈ N spend ej dollars in R&D eﬀort, and in which the
winner is the firm for which ej θ˜j is largest, where θ˜j are independent draws
from an exponential distribution (see Hirshleifer and Riley 1992, p.380n.).
Other stochastic R&D-models leading to the same success function have been
analyzed in Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and in Baye and Hoppe (2001).
The contest success function (11) has also been axiomatized by Skaperdas
(1996).
In what follows we will consider the case K = {1, 2} with n1 firms in
country 1 and n2 firms in country 2. The analysis can be generalized to
many countries, but, because of possible corner solutions, not very elegantly.
The two-country case is much more straightforward but still rich enough to
analyse and understand the main strategic problems that arise when trade
policy and mergers interact in contests. The governments in the two countries
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may subsidize the innovation eﬀorts by proportional subsidy rates s1 and s2,
respectively. The subsidy reduces the cost of firm i in country j from ei to
(1−sj)ei. We assume that the subsidy rates are constrained to sj ≤ smax < 1.
The maximum requirement smax means that governments are not able to
assume the whole cost of eﬀort, or even more than this cost. We will allow
for negative subsidy rates, in which case the country taxes contest eﬀort.
The same timing as in the Cournot game in section 2 applies: first the
two countries simultaneously choose their subsidies, s1 and s2. Then these
subsidies are observed by all firms and, hence, are known to the firms when
they make their (simultaneous) eﬀort choices.
The firms’ payoﬀ functions are
Πi =
ei
E
− (1− sj)ei ≡ σi − ajσiE (13)
for firm i in country j. The definitions of the share in total eﬀort, σi ≡ ei/E
and the unit eﬀort cost aj ≡ (1 − sj) net of subsidies/taxes that are made
implicitly by the second equality in (13) are convenient when solving for the
equilibrium.9 In turn, the welfare in country j is
Wj =
X
i∈Nj
(qi(e)− ei) =
X
i∈Nj
σi(1−E) for j = 1, 2. (14)
In Appendix B we confirm the following result:
Lemma 2 Profits for firms i in country 1 and welfare in country 1 in an
interior equilibrium of the contest model with strategic trade policy are given
by
Π∗i (n1, n2) =
(n2 − 1)2
n21 (n− 2)
2 for i ∈ N1 (15)
and
W ∗1 (n1, n2) =
n2 − 1
(n− 2)n , (16)
and analogously for country 2.
These results can be used to assess the consequences of a merger in an
industry in which competition is characterized by a contest. Given the ran-
dom innovation process described by Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p. 380n.),
or promotional competition as in Schmalensee (1992), merger of a subset of
9Cornes and Hartley (2001) were the first to consider the contest problem in terms of
contribution shares and aggregate contributions. This method simplifies the algebra even
in cases with more than two heterogenous contestants.
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Figure 2: Combinations of n and n2 for which a bilateral merger is profitable.
Notice that, of course, n > n2 has to hold what is not considered in the figure.
M ⊂ Nj of firms in one country simply means that the merged firms jointly
choose the amount spent on contest eﬀort
P
i∈M ei to maximize their joint
profits.10 The win probability for a firm i becomes qi = ei/E if the firm is
not in the set of merging firms, and the joint win probability for the firms in
the set M of merging firms is
P
i∈M
ei
E
.
Proposition 3 Let there be n1 and n2 firms in country 1 and 2, respectively.
Consider a merger of m firms in country 2. If the equilibrium is in the
interior before and after the merger, then (i) the merger harms competitors
in country 1 if n1 > 1 and does not change their profits if n1 = 1. (ii) The
merger benefits competitors of the merging firms in country 2. (iii) The set
of merging firms gains if (n2)2(n− 2)2 > m(n2 −m+ 1)2(n−m− 1)2.
A proof compares the relevant expressions for profits that are obtained
from (15). For the special case of a bilateral merger, Figure 2 shows com-
binations of n and n2 for which the merger is profitable. As with Cournot
competition, it can be seen that bilateral mergers only pay if there are not
too many firms in the country in which the merger takes place. Typically, a
bilateral merger pays here if there are three or two firms in the country and
does not if there are more.
The change in welfare in the two countries is as follows.
Proposition 4 Let there be n1 and n2 firms in country 1 and 2, respectively.
Consider a merger of m firms in country 2. Assume that the equilibrium
10In Huck, Konrad, and Müller (2001) we discuss alternative meanings of merger in
contest models.
12
is an interior equilibrium with and without the merger for all firms. The
merger increases welfare in country 2. It decreases welfare in country 1 if
n2[1− 2n+m] > 1 +m− n2.
A proof compares levels of welfare with and without the merger using
(16). The results in Lemma 2 and Propositions 3 and 4 are very similar to
the results obtained for Cournot competition. Strategic trade policy makes
merger and acquisition in a country more beneficial for the firms in this
country and increases welfare in this country. It harms foreign competitors
and may reduce welfare in the foreign country. However, these results are
valid only for equilibria in the interior of the strategy space. The game
considered here frequently has corner solutions. We will therefore consider an
example with n1 = 1, n2 = 2 and m = 2, that fits well with with the merger
between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas. There is one firm A in country
1 and two firms B and M in country 2 if no merger occurs. The reaction
functions are parametric cases of (31) and (32) in the Appendix, but take
into account restrictions on subsidies, sj ∈ [smin, smax], with smax < 1 and
smin < −1:
a1 = max
½
6a2 − 4(a2)2
2a2 + 1
, (1− smax)
¾
and
a2 = max
n
min
n
2− a1
2
, (1− smin)
o
, (1− smax)
o
.
For the case with smin ≤ −1, the strategic trade equilibrium is characterized
by
s1 = smax and
s2 = −
1 + smax
2
.
For these equilibrium values, profits of firms and welfare of countries in the
equilibrium for smax ∈ (0, 1) are
ΠA =
1
4
(1 + smax)
2 and ΠB = ΠM =
1
16
(1− smax)2 and (17)
W1 =
1
4
+
smax
4
, and W2 =
1
4
− smax
4
, (18)
respectively.
To assess the implications of a merger between B and M we solve for the
equilibrium of an analogous game in which there is one firm A in country 1,
and one firm BM in country 2 that resulted from the merger between B and
M . For the two resulting firms in countries 1 and 2, respectively, the contest
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equilibrium is characterized by σA = 1− aAaA+aBM , σBM = 1−
aBM
aA+aBM
, andE =
1
aA+aBM
. Substituting these equations in the welfare functionW1 = σA−σAE
and diﬀerentiating yields country 1’s reaction function a1(a2) = 2 − a2 and
country 2’s reaction function a2(a1) = 2− a1.
Accordingly, the strategic trade equilibrium has multiple equilibria but
only one that is symmetric, with s1 = s2 = 0. This symmetric equilibrium
leads to profits and welfare levels of
ΠA =W1 = ΠBM = W2 =
1
4
.
Comparing the welfare levels in the situation without a merger to the
welfare levels in the situation with a merger, the outcome generally depends
on which equilibrium is chosen in the case with a merger. But as a1+ a2 = 2
in any equilibrium, we obtain
W1 =
1
4
+
s1
4
and W2 =
1
4
− s1
4
with s1 = −s2 in equilibrium. This shows that regardless of the equilibrium
selected country 2 is better oﬀ if B and M merge.11 However, it seems
intuitive to select the unique symmetric equilibrium in the post-merger game.
This case is summarized in the following
Proposition 5 If n1 = 1 and n2 = 2, a merger in country 2 has the following
eﬀects: (i) the country in which the merger occurs benefits from the merger,
(ii) the other country loses from the merger, (iii) the merging firms benefit
from the merger, and (iv) the firm that is not involved in the merger loses
from the merger.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we consider the profitability of merger in an international con-
text in which governments use strategic trade policy. The analysis is stim-
ulated by the takeover of McDonnell-Douglas by Boeing and other recent
takeover attempts among firms which compete for high-tech products in in-
ternational markets, and in which strategic trade policy is a particularly
relevant aspect. We show that strategic trade policy can be a key explana-
tion of why mergers between firms in the same country occur. We can also
11The only exception is the extreme case in which s1 = smax in which country 2’s gain
is zero.
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explain why the country in which the merger takes place may gain whereas
other countries and competing firms in these other countries may lose.
It is well known that merger can harm firms. For instance, in Cournot
markets, the merger increases industry profits, but decreases the merged
firms’ share in these profits, and the latter eﬀect can overcompensate the
former. With strategic trade policy, however, there is an additional eﬀect.
The merger of two firms in one country increase this country’s incentives to
use strategic trade policy, and, in turn, a trade policy equilibrium emerges
in which the country in which the merger occurred chooses higher trade
subsidies and the country in which no merger occurred chooses lower trade
subsidies. This, in turn, benefits the merging firms (Boeing and McDonnell-
Douglas in our example) and harms the firm that is not involved in a merger
(Airbus). This trade-policy eﬀect of merger can overcompensate the eﬀects
that make a merger unprofitable in a laissez-faire world for the case of quan-
tity competition and for other forms of competition, like, for example, R&D
contests or promotional competition. Accordingly,
• firms involved in the merger can benefit from the merger,
• firms not involved in the merger can lose from the merger of firms in
another country,
• the country in which the merger occurs can gain from the merger, and
• the country in which the firm is located that is not involved in the
merger can lose from the merger.
Apart from explaining the incentives for the merger between Boeing and
McDonnell-Douglas, our results predict that Boeing will receive bigger subsi-
dies after the merger, and Airbus will receive smaller governmental subsidies
in the future.
The finding in this section illustrates a more general point. Merger ac-
tivities are part of a more complex strategic game, and the merger changes
actions made by players other than the firms involved in the merger and their
competitors. These strategic eﬀects should not be neglected when assessing
the profitability of a merger.
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Appendix
A Solution of the two-stage Cournot oligopoly
with strategic trade policy
We look only for subgameperfect equilibria of the two-stage game of Cournot
oligopoly in a strategic trade environment. Sometimes we will use a super-
script i with the subsidy variable; si signifies the subsidy which firm i receives.
As all firms in a country receive the same subsidy, si = sr = sj holds for
all firms i and r in country j. It will be convenient to use S ≡
P
i∈N s
i =P
j∈K njsj.
For given trade subsidies, firm i’s best-response function can be written
implicitly as
xi − si = 1−X − c. (19)
Taking the sum of all left-hand and all right-hand sides of (19) we obtain the
total quantity X as a function of the “total subsidies” S. Substituting into
(19) yields the equilibrium quantities as
x∗i =
1− c− S
n+ 1
+ si. (20)
Firm i’s profits are given by
Πi = (x∗i )
2 (21)
and country j’s welfare by
Wj =
X
i∈Nj
x∗i (p(X
∗)− c) =
X
i∈Nj
x∗i (x
∗
i − sj). (22)
This describes the Cournot outcome for given subsidies. We now turn to the
strategic trade policy game in which each country maximizes (22) by a choice
of sj. Country j’s best response function is obtained by diﬀerentiating (22)
with respect to sj .
dWj
dsj
=
X
i∈Nj
µ
∂x∗i
∂sj
(2x∗i − sj)− x∗i
¶
=
X
i∈Nj
µ
x∗i
n+ 1− 2nj
n+ 1
− sj
n+ 1− nj
n+ 1
¶
.
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Using symmetry of firms within the same country the resulting first-order
condition can be written as
sj = x
∗
i
n+ 1− 2nj
n+ 1− nj
with i ∈ Nj
Substituting x∗i by (20) the first-order condition can be rewritten as
sjnj = (1− c− S)
n+ 1− 2nj
n+ 1
. (23)
Summing both sides of (23) over countries gives
S = (1− c− S)(k − 2n
n+ 1
).
Hence, in equilibrium
S = (1− c) k(n+ 1)− 2n
k(n+ 1)− n+ 1 . (24)
Inserting (24) into (23) and re-arranging gives the equilibrium subsidies
as
s∗j = (1− c)
(n+ 1− 2nj)
(kn+ k − n+ 1)nj
. (25)
Hence, by (20) and (21 ) firm i in country j supplies
x∗i = (1− c)
n− nj + 1
(kn+ k − n+ 1)nj
(26)
and earns
Π∗i =
·
(1− c) n− nj + 1
(kn+ k − n+ 1)nj
¸2
. (27)
Accordingly, we can compute country j’s welfare as
W ∗j = (1− c)
2 n− nj + 1
(kn+ k − n+ 1)2
. (28)
This concludes the proof. ¤
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B Solution of the two-stage contest game with
strategic trade policy
Consider first the contest subgame. Firms’ first-order conditions are σi =
1− ajE. Using
P
i∈N σi = 1 this yields
E =
n1 + n2 − 1
n1a1 + n2a2
, (29)
which leads to the equilibrium share
σi = 1− aj
n1 + n2 − 1
n1a1 + n2a2
. (30)
for a firm i in country j. Substitution of these values in the welfare functions
(14) and calculation of the first-order conditions with respect to a1 and a2,
respectively, yields countries’ reaction functions
a1 = n2a2
2n1 − n2a2 + n2 − 1
n1 (n2a2 + n2 − 1)
(31)
and
a2 = n1a1
2n2 − n1a1 + n1 − 1
n2 (n1a1 + n1 − 1)
. (32)
Note that a1 and a2 cannot be negative, because smax < 1. Accordingly, for
a huge set of parameters there can be a corner solution in which one country
chooses the maximum subsidy, and the other country reacts optimally to this
choice. An example with n1 = 1 and n2 = 2 is discussed in the main text. If
there is an interior solution, it is determined by
a1 =
n21 + n1n2 − n1 − n2
(n1 − 2 + n2)n1
(33)
and
a2 =
n22 + n1n2 − n1 − n2
(n1 − 2 + n2)n2
. (34)
Accordingly, total contest eﬀort is
E =
n1 + n2 − 1
n1 + n2
(35)
and each firm in country 1 and in country 2 spend shares
σ1 =
n2 − 1
(n1 + n2 − 2)n1
(36)
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and
σ2 =
n1 − 1
(n1 + n2 − 2)n2
. (37)
respectively. These results are substituted into (13) and (14) to obtain the
equilibrium profits and the welfare as in Lemma 2. ¤
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